Many recent studies on EMU have found business cycle asymmetries among potential members of the union to be quite relevant. In this paper we investigate whether asymmetric shocks to output are less important for industries which are more open to trade and more technology-intensive. Our results, obtained from a correlation analysis between growth rates of value added in thirteen manufacturing industries in eleven European countries between 1979 and 1990, clearly support the hypothesis. This finding suggests that an institutional environment (such as a monetary union) which is likely to further increase trade and technological innovation and diffusion among its members may help to decrease the importance of the asymmetric components of the business cycle.
Introduction *
Many recent analyses of the benefits and costs of joining EMU have focused on the importance of asymmetries in the business cycle among potential members of the union. Many researchers have found these asymmetries to be quite relevant for the EU as a whole. In our view, however, the implications of these results have sometimes been over-emphasized. While business cycle asymmetries are clearly a negative entry in the balance of benefits and costs resulting from the participation to EMU, it should also be clear that they can be taken care of, for instance by an appropriate design of fiscal policy or by incentives to increase factor mobility within the union.
Furthermore, what has been often neglected is that such asymmetries are not exogenous to the institutional context of the economy, and that they are likely to be influenced by the decision of European countries to participate in the EU and in EMU. In this paper we inquire in particular whether an increased openness to trade within European industries (which is the predicted outcome of the establishment of one market and of the adoption of a single currency) and a higher degree of technological intensity are correlated with a reduced importance of business cycle asymmetries.
For this purpose, we estimate and interpret a statistical model of the evolution of, and correlation between, growth rates of value added of thirteen manufacturing industries in eleven European countries, between 1979 and 1990. We document to what extent growth rates in each "local industry" are correlated at the country or at the industry level, and whether the relative * Previous versions of this paper have appeared as "Contributi di ricerca Crenos, 96/5", and as IGIER W.P. 1996, no. 109. We thank Crenos (Cagliari) and Igier (Milano) for research support. Rodolfo Helg and Paolo Manasse commented extensively on the first draft of this paper. We also thank for comments participants at the Eastern Economic Association 1997 Annual Conference and at the Bank of Italy-Sadiba 1997 Conference. Wim Deblauwe provided excellent research assistance. All errors are our own.
importance of these correlations is related to some specific characteristics of each local industryand in particular to the importance of international trade and to the degree of technological intensity.
To motivate intuitively our line of research consider, as an example, two industries in the same country, the first one of which sells in foreign countries a higher share of its output: the first industry, probably, is relatively more exposed to the international business cycle, and less exposed to the domestic component of the business cycle 1 . But then, as barriers to trade in the second industry are reduced, the degree of asymmetry will also be reduced. In this view, contrary to the analysis à la Mundell (1961) , the existence of symmetry between countries is no longer a prerequisite, but will instead become the outcome of a process of full economic integration.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we review the literature and, in section 3, we discuss the hypotheses to be tested. In section 4 we briefly describe the data and evaluate the results of the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
The evidence on asymmetric shocks, and their relevance to EMU
In this section we briefly review and discuss the literature on two related issues. First, we evaluate the evidence documenting the relevance of asymmetries in the business cycles of different countries. Second, we discuss to what extent this evidence has implications for the desirability of monetary unification.
1 The answer to this question would probably be the same, whether the international business cycle is mainly driven by innovations on the demand or on the supply side.
Review of the literature
Typically, the literature on international real business cycles finds that country-specific sources of variation dominate over industry-specific sources. This points to the prevailing of asymmetric cyclical fluctuations. See Backus, Kehoe and Kidland (1992) and Costello (1993) .
Other papers look at the correlation properties of stock market returns, and they also find that returns are more strongly correlated along the country rather than the industry dimension. See Drummen and Zimmerman (1992) and Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) .
Parallel to this, another literature has been developing in the recent years. Its main concern is to assess the relevance of business cycle asymmetries, viewed as an obstacle to the establishment of a currency area within a group of countries. Most of this literature is related to the debate on EMU. The starting point has been the paper by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) . They found that, identifying Germany as the anchor area , four other countries join Germany in the core of the EU: Belgium, Denmark, France and Netherlands. This core is defined by a high correlation of supply shocks, and to a lesser extent also of demand shocks, within this group of countries. In a similar vein, Bini Smaghi and Vori (1993) , using disaggregate data, find that for the six founding members of the EC, 60% of the explained variance of manufacturing output is explained by sectorspecific shocks alone. For 10 EC countries, this percentage is 23% (for 1976-1990) . This again points to the existence of a core of countries with a considerable degree of symmetry.
Using a different empirical model, Helg, Manasse, Monacelli and Rovelli (1995; henceforth HMMR) found that, for all EU countries, within-country correlations of output growth dominate over within-industry correlations. Similarly, after modeling output innovations as residuals from a cointegrated VAR, they used principal components analysis to show that more variance of output innovations is explained at the country, rather than the industry level. This points to a potentially high level of asymmetry. However, they also found that, within a subset of the EU countries, country principal components are strongly correlated with each other. On this basis, they identify a core of "symmetric" countries, which include in the inner layer Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, followed by Denmark and France.
Whereas the papers referred to above examine data for the manufacturing sectors only, Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) define 8 sectors, which add up -in terms of valued added -to GDP.
They also distinguish between long and short run disturbances. They found that in the long run (average growth rates) region-specific disturbances are dominant in Europe, negligible in the US 2 .
From the point of view of the business cycle, they also found that short-term fluctuations in Europe tend to be in general more "idiosyncratic". In the Manufacturing, Transport and Trade sectors, in particular, regional shocks (even if they explain less variance than sectoral shocks) are in relative terms considerably more important than in the US, as they account for 20-28% of total variance.
Thus the literature on EMU points to the fact that, as far as output or value added is concerned, there is a core of countries with a higher degree of symmetry (country-specific innovations are of relatively low importance), but that if we extend the analysis to include all the countries in the EU (during the Eighties, eleven countries) then country or idiosyncratic factors gain importance.
Is asymmetry an obstacle to monetary unification?
In general, the evidence which we have reviewed shows the importance of country factors (at least outside a core of EU countries): that is, of shocks which are not positively correlated, and 2 Significantly, however, region-specific disturbances are not important in Europe as far as employment growth is concerned. In another paper which looks primarily at the determinants of employment, Marimon and Zilibotti (1996) also find that almost 80% of the long-run employment growth differentials across EU countries and industries is accounted by sectoral effects, and only 20% by country effects. However, the latter figure rises to 47% over the business cycle frequency. Melitz, 1994) .
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• Similarly, in a world of two, incompletely specialized countries, or with different regions within each country, it is not clear whether an "asymmetric" shock (between the two countries) is also "symmetric" inside one country. That is, because industries are not homogeneously located within a country, different regions might be affected differently by the shock. If this is the case (that is, if an existing country is not an optimal currency area), then it is not necessarily true that either country will want to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument against that shock (See Bofinger, 1994, and Melitz, 1994) .
At a different level of analysis, if policy makers within a group of "asymmetric" countries are able and willing to commit to long run policy choices, they will weight the short run benefits of using the exchange rate as a tool of stabilization policy against the long run benefits of committing of different origin. Although it would be interesting to examine in some detail and possibly explain this difference, this is not the purpose of this paper.
to exchange rate (and possibly, monetary) stability and (if the conclusions of this paper are correct) the may also anticipate that, as exchange rate stability fosters trade and economic integration between countries, the cyclical behavior of industrial sectors will become more positively correlated among those countries. This implication has been examined in particular by Frankel and Rose (1996) . In a paper which is motivated by the same considerations discussed in this paper, they examine bilateral trade and real activity data for 21 countries and find that "closer international trade links result in more closely correlated business cycles across countries." (p.
2)
The purpose of this paper is thus to examine the validity of the last argument mentioned above. For instance, we shall document to what extent the magnitude of asymmetries is lower in more open industries. If this is so, then this would establish a prima facie argument in favor of asymmetries being endogenous to the process of trade integration. These issues will be more thoroughly discussed in the following section.
Trade, innovation and asymmetry
In this section we discuss how the extent to which one country is exposed to output shocks of an (a)symmetric nature (relatively to other countries) may be influenced by economic variables such as the degree of trade openness and of technological intensity.
We begin with a more precise definition of symmetry. A demand or supply shock is "symmetric" within a group of industries if it affects them in the same direction. Hence an industry is in a symmetric situation if the role of domestic idiosyncratic factors (demand and supply conditions in other industries; level and composition of final demand; labor market conditions) in 3 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) analyze the determinants of bilateral nominal exchange rate variability within a group of 21, mostly European, countries. They find differences in growth rates to be an important explanatory variable, whereas the size of bilateral exports is negatively related to exchange rate variability.
explaining the cyclical behavior of that industry does not dominate (or is low) relatively to the role attributable to international factors. In a world where all industries are symmetric, business cycles should be contemporaneously correlated across countries. We define "asymmetric" the opposite situation, in which "country" variables matter considerably.
The role of trade openness
In a closed economy, it is natural to assume that demand or supply shocks are independently distributed of, and thus asymmetric to, those affecting other countries. As this economy opens up to trade, demand shocks affecting other countries will also affect its exporting industries. Supply shocks to inputs will affect all the industries world-wide that use such inputs. This introduces the first conjecture.
Conjecture 1. For a given technology, more open sectors are more likely to be affected by demand and supply shocks which are symmetric across countries.
From modern approaches to international trade we know that, if industry structure is imperfectly competitive, this will lead to intra-industry trade and the pattern of specialization will also be more similar across countries. 4 This suggests that more symmetry should follow as long as more intra-industry trade develops. In general, empirical trade literature agrees on the fact that intra-industry trade has indeed been a characteristic feature of international trade in the postwar period. This confirms the plausibility of the hypothesis that more trade should produce more symmetry.
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4 Other approaches emphasize instead the tendency of trade to produce (at the limit, complete) specialization. This is so both in the more traditional approach, based on comparative advantages, and in the more recent literature, based on agglomeration economies (Krugman, 1991) . 5 To understand more clearly the relationship between openness and symmetry, consider the following examples.
Assume that local industry A1 (industry 1 in country A) sells its output in equal shares in countries A, B, C. However, local industries B1 and C1 only produce for the domestic market. The discussion in the text suggests that we should relate symmetry to trade openness. But in the context of this example the relationship between symmetry and trade openness is not an obvious one. By construction, the sales of industry A1 will not be more correlated to
Country versus industry factors
Until now, we have defined symmetry as implying a reduced role played by country factors (once factors affecting the international business cycle are taken into account). But should we also define as more symmetric a situation where each local industry is more strongly correlated, across the business cycle, with the corresponding local industries in other countries? It may be tempting to answer positively, and to some extent this has been the accepted answer in the literature. See Stockman (1988) and HMMR. For instance, the latter argue: "industry-wide shocks may naturally spread across countries, hence they embody an element of symmetry" (p.1030). While this may be plausible, we note that it is not equivalent to a "necessary" condition for symmetry. 7 Thus we shall seek an answer to the following question, although we do not have a priori arguments in favor of either a positive or a negative answer.
the evolution of (say) aggregate demand in A than in B or C; thus, according to our definition of symmetry as reduced influence of domestic factors, industry A1 is subject to symmetric shocks, while industries B1 and C1 are not (since they are only influenced by local demand conditions). But all three industries are, by definition, open. It might seem more plausible to argue that, if trade is unidirectional (in either direction), it does not necessarily make an industry more symmetric (industry A1 trades and is symmetric; industry B1 trades and is not symmetric). Thus, Conjecture 1 must be taken to imply that trade openness of a particular local industry is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient requisite for symmetry. This example might also be taken to imply that exports, more than trade openness, are a relevant indicator of symmetry. However, this conclusion (although it is confirmed by our particular example) is not necessarily true. Consider the following example. Industry A1 is as before, and industries B1 and C1 again produce for the domestic market only, but using imported input from A1. In this case, and to the extent that a technological shock hits A1's exports of intermediate products to the other countries, then we might observe a symmetric (and also industry-wide) shock. In this example, symmetry is related not so much to exports vs. imports, but to the fact that, even if unidirectional, trade is of the intra-industry rather than of the inter-industry type. While this is probably a better way to characterize our conjecture, unfortunately in our data we cannot distinguish between inter and intra industry trade. Despite this limitation, we think it may nevertheless be interesting to characterize empirically to what extent the relevance of country and/or of industry-wide variables is associated with the degree of openness.
Question 1: Is a reduced role of country factors (a signal of more symmetry) associated with an increased role of industry factors?

The role of technology
As countries compete in the international market, there will be pressure in each industry to adopt the best technologies around, and to search for better ones. In open economies, the same industry will tend to adopt the same technology in different countries or locations, and thus will be exposed to the same technological shocks (Stockman, 1988) . Thus, a compelling question concerns the role of technology, and of the way it is disseminated across countries and industries, with respect to the correlation of business cycles. To the extent that the same technology is adopted everywhere, then technology shocks will be a source of symmetry. This reinforces our first conjecture. A further question however is whether this symmetry-inducing role of technology is related to the degree of technological development of an industry, or to the speed of the process of technological innovation (as measured, for instance, by the amount of resources spent for R&D). The answer to this question, however, would seem to require a more detailed analysis of the process of technology adoption, which we cannot accomplish on the basis of our data set.
Thus we shall not venture into specific conjectures on the relationship between the amount of resources spent for R&D and the extent of symmetry. Nevertheless, we shall examine this issue empirically: 
Summing up
In this section, we have reached the conclusion that the degree of openness (in particular, to intra-industry trade) should affect positively the exposure to symmetric shocks (conjecture 1) and, in particular, to symmetric technology shocks (conjecture 2). Also, we have observed that the notion of symmetry is inversely related to the importance of country factors, whereas we have no a priori on whether empirically a reduced role of country factors should also be associated with an increased role of industry factors (question 1). Only to the extent that all local industries in a world-wide industry are symmetric, then industry-wide factors will become dominant. Finally, we have suggested that it would be interesting to explore if there is an empirical relationship between the rate of technology-related (R&D) expenditures and the degree of symmetry (question 2). In the next section we shall discuss how to explore these questions in our data set, and evaluate the results of the empirical analysis.
Evidence
For the empirical analysis we use a set of data assembled for the purpose of this study. The data base includes complete annual series for value added, R&D expenditures, imports and exports, for 13 manufacturing industries and 11 European countries over the period [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . 
Country and industry correlations
The first descriptive measure of the degree of symmetry, or asymmetry, is the correlation of growth rates of value added, across industries and countries It is worth remarking that 69% of the 143 country correlations in Table A.2 are significant at the 5% level, while this percentage drops to 30% for the industry correlations in Table A and also Greece (but the low average in this case is due to the behavior of the Chemical industry).
On the other hand, average industry correlations in Table A .3 are all below 16%, with the exception of France.
We have done a similar computation, taking averages (of either country or industry correlations) for each industry across all countries (see the last two columns of Tables A.2 
and A.3, respectively). The average country correlations are above 17% in all industries except Office and Precision Instruments, and well above the corresponding average industry correlations (except for Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Office and Precision Instruments).
To further synthesize and present this information, we plot the average (for each country) of all its industries' country correlations (the last but one row of Table A .2) and the average of all its industries' industry correlations (the last but one row of Table A. 3) on the horizontal and vertical axis of Figure 1 .a, respectively. We notice that for all countries the average of country correlations is larger than the average of industry correlations. From the figure we also note that peripheric and small countries lie closer to the origin. In general these findings confirm those of HMMR.
[Insert Figures 1.a and 1.b here]
We have followed a parallel procedure for each industry in the sample, using the penultimate columns of Tables A.2 , the average of their country correlations is larger than the average of their industry correlations.
We may thus conclude that most manufacturing industries in our sample have higher and more significant growth rates correlations within their country of location than with their industrial homologues in other countries. We now turn to examine how these data might change across different subsamples, on the basis of the questions and conjectures raised in Section 3.
The patterns of country correlations across subsamples
As a preliminary step to this analysis we need to find appropriate ways of dividing our sample according to the characteristics of the local industries on which we are focusing. We have defined the following sample splits.
• Split 1 (according to trade openness: 4 equal sized groups)
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• Split 2.A (according to technological intensity measured for each local industry: 4 groups)
• Split 2.B (according to technological intensity measured at the EU level for each industry):
I. low (with R&D/VA below 1%): food, textiles, wood, paper II. middle (between 1 and 3%): rubber, mineral products, basic metal industries, metal products, non-electrical machinery III. high (above 6%): chemicals, electrical machinery, transport equipment, office and precision instruments
• Split 3 (according to country characteristics selected with cluster analysis -See Table 1) 9 The exceptions are Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Office and Precision Instruments. 10 As described in Table A .0, we measure trade openness with respect to total exports and imports. Results do not change if we consider only within-Europe trade.
• Split 4 (according to industry characteristics selected with cluster analysis -See Table 2 ).
The last two splits are based on a cluster analysis that allows us to identify homogeneous groups of observations on the basis of characteristics defined at the country or the industry level.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] We now examine how the patterns of correlations at the country level change when we split the sample according to the criteria defined above. We expect that country correlations should be less pronounced for the group of local industries characterized by a higher degree of trade openness. Moreover we want to assess if a higher degree of technological intensity is related to a lower degree of asymmetry. For each of the 5 splits we have averaged within country correlations (from Table A .2) and within industry correlations (from Table A. 3) between the growth rates of value added for each local industry. Averages and their standard deviations are reported in Table   3 .
[Insert Table 3 here]
Within-country correlations
We As for the groupings based on cluster analysis, we observe in Split 3 that, as it might be intuitively expected, within-country correlations are much higher for the larger countries (0.31 versus 0.18-0.19 for the other two groups). Large countries have in common a much lower degree of openness (even if they also share a higher technological intensity). From Split 4 we observe that the lowest degree of asymmetry is in cluster 2 (r=0.15, implying that on average correlations are not significant even at the 10% level), which is characterized by the highest levels of trade openness and technological intensity.
Summing up, we have found that the correlation of growth rates of local industries within countries is lower, the larger are the degrees of openness and of technological intensity of the local industries (Split 1, 2.A, 2.B, 4). They are instead higher in larger countries.
Within-industry correlations
Considering within-industry correlations (the last columns of Table 3 ), the pattern of their changes across sub-samples is less clear, as on average correlations are never significant (as we had already found from the examination of whole sample). In particular there is no evidence that within-industry correlations of growth rates are higher or become significant for the more open or more technological intensive industries.
Country versus industry effects in growth rates regressions
A second procedure we follow to validate our conjectures is based on the estimation of a statistical model. We performed regressions of the growth rates of value added on a set of dummies, representing respectively pure time effects (TIME), time-varying country effects (COUNTRY) common for all industries in a country, and time-varying industry effects (INDUSTRY) common for all countries to which each industry belongs
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. We expect that the contribution of the COUNTRY dummies (measuring the importance of asymmetric components in the business cycle)
should decrease (or, in the limit, become not significant) when we restrict the sample to the more open industries. We do not have specific expectations towards the results from the sample restricted to the more high-tech industries (although, to be consistent with the findings of section 4.1, we should find that also in this case the COUNTRY dummies play a reduced role Examining the results in some detail, the first row in Table 4 reports the explained variance of growth rates of value added in the whole sample (1573 observations over the years [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [Insert Table 4 here] SPLIT 1. (Ranking of all local industries according to trade openness). The R 2 obtained from inclusion of COUNTRY and TIME effects only decreases as we move to the more open group of industries. In the fourth group, the exclusion of the COUNTRY effects (when the TIME and INDUSTRY effect are included) cannot be statistically rejected at the 1% significance level.
12 Following Marimon and Zilibotti (1996) we have normalized each dependent variable by its within sample standard deviation. 13 We do not consider split 3, as the resulting subsamples are already divided across countries.
SPLIT 2.A. (Ranking of all local industries according to technological intensity). Regressions in the four groups show that R 2 due to COUNTRY effects decreases from the first two (less technological intensive) to the second two groups (although in the fourth it is higher than in the third).
SPLIT 2.B. (Ranking of Euro-wide industries according to technological intensity). The R 2 explained by COUNTRY effects decreases systematically from the low to the high TEC industries.
SPLIT 4. (Sample split on the basis of the four clusters defined in Table 2 ). We observe the lowest R 2 for CLUSTER 2 (characterized by high openness) and also CLUSTER 4 (characterized by high technological intensity). And again in these two sub-samples (and only in these) the COUNTRY dummies are not statistically significant.
Summing up, with the partial exception of Split 2.A, all the results confirm that the COUNTRY effects are much less relevant in the more open and technologically advanced industries. We have also examined the regression looking for separate effects of the industry dummies and testing for their exclusion. As for the correlation analysis of section 4.2, there is no systematic change in the effect of the dummies across subsamples, and the exclusion of these dummies is generally accepted (data not reported, available on request).
Summing up the empirical findings
In reference to the questions and conjectures raised in section 3, we have found the following answers.
• The extent to which growth rates in manufacturing industries in Europe are characterized by country-specific (asymmetric) effects is inversely related to the level of trade openness. This may be due to intra-industry trade spreading shocks across countries (conjecture 1), and also to technology innovations being "imported" through trade (conjecture 2).
• A reduced role of country-specific factors is not in general associated with an increased role of industry factors, as measured by either the correlation or the regression analysis. So the short answer to question 1 is negative.
• Industries with a higher volume of R&D expenditures exhibit a higher degree of symmetric behavior. So the answer to question 2 is affirmative.
Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we have shown that the importance of country effects on growth rates in the manufacturing industry is inversely related to the levels of trade openness and of technological intensity. Is there any policy relevant implication of these findings? In the literature on currency areas, the fact that a group of countries is exposed to asymmetric, country-specific business cycle disturbances is considered as an obstacle to the adoption of a common currency (or to fixing the exchange rate). While this is (not the only factor to be taken into account, but) certainly correct in a static framework, the existence of some asymmetries may be related to the scarce extent of integration within those countries, and thus the decision to establish a currency area (or a monetary union) may validate itself in the process of time, as increasing integration, fostered by the union, will eventually lead to a more harmonized cyclical behavior across the participating countries.
In the empirical analysis we have identified two factors that may act as a vehicle of further integration between countries: trade and technology. Thus, we should expect to find a more symmetric behavior (across different countries) for those "local industries" which are more open to trade and which require greater expenditures in technology.
Since both factors -trade and technology diffusion within a group of countries -are likely to be strengthened as transactions costs are reduced and factor mobility is increased, as would be the case in a full monetary union, the broad policy implications of our findings are clear. However, a word of caution is required in at least four respects, which would also warrant an extension of our research perspective:
(i) First, our analysis has not shed any light on the time-scale of the process of integration fostered by the growth of trade and the diffusion of technology. The longer is this process, the greater may be the short-run costs of a monetary union.
(ii) Second, while our findings support the notion that such a monetary union might be beneficial in reducing business cycle asymmetries, would we obtain the same results if we had used as a starting point for the empirical analysis regions rather than local industries? Also, would the same conclusions also apply had we considered a more heterogeneous group of countries (in terms of their initial level of industrial development)? Or what alternative policies and solutions might instead be adopted in such cases? Clearly our analysis does not shed any light in this respect.
(iii) Third, it would be desirable to know and understand more about the industry dynamics which lead to greater integration through trade, growth and technology diffusion. For instance, are multinational companies better at promoting integration? And which other policies, if any, should be activated to complement the adoption of a monetary union at the macro level?
(iv) Fourth, to what extent would we have reached the same conclusions, if we had extended our analysis to other branches of economic activity besides the manufacturing industries? As the contribution of manufacturing to the generation of value added is generally decreasing in developed economies, this question is clearly an important one. However, our ability to explore these issues is constrained by an unavoidable trade-off between searching for (a)symmetries at a sufficient level of disaggregation, and taking into account the whole spectrum of economic activity in each country. We suspect that, if we took a more aggregate perspective, reducing the disaggregation in manufacturing to include other broad sectors (other industries, agriculture and Tables A2  and A3 ) within each split.
Critical r for different significance levels for country correlations (132 observations) are: 1% = 0.225; 5% = 0.172 ; for industry correlations (110 observations) are: 1% = 0.245; 5% = 0.187. The dependent variable is the growth rate of value added (GVA) divided by the standard deviation (in the time dimension) of GVA of local industry. Annual data, 1980 Annual data, -1990 All the dummies are time-indexed.
The F-tests evaluate the exclusion of the COUNTRY dummies: R = reject exclusion at 1% level of significance; (A) = do not reject exclusion at 1%, reject at 5% level; A= reject at 1% level. Notes: Each correlation coefficient is calculated on the basis of 110 observations (11 growth rates times 10 countries). Critical r for different significance levels are: 1% = 0.245; 5% = 0.187.
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